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Abstract
The challenge for critical corporate law scholars is to provide an account of 
corporate law that accommodates responsiveness to the public interest. This 
involves defining a space for debate about both the public policy goals of 
corporate law and the regulatory mechanisms for achieving those goals. This task 
is a complex one because it involves recognising the insights of law and 
economics scholars, in particular, that corporations are at once important 
components of markets and constituted by those markets. A recent book and 
winner of the 2008 Hart Socio-Legal Book Prize, The Constitutional Corporation
by Stephen Bottomley, provides just such an account of corporate law. This book 
provides a pragmatic account of corporate law which opens up corporate law to 
political concerns while acknowledging that corporate law is private in its 
orientation. This review of The Constitutional Corporation provides an overview 
of Bottomley’s analysis, locates his approach in broader theoretical debates about 
corporate law and examines the potential of the approach to develop systems of 
corporate social responsibility in order to meet impending global challenges such 
as climate change.
1. Introduction: Corporate Law Theory — The State of Play 
Since the rediscovery of the Coase Theorem by Jensen and Meckling in the late 
1970s, corporate law theory has been dominated by economic analysis which 
posits that the corporation is a nexus of contracts. 
Jensen and Meckling stated that the ‘corporation … is simply a nexus for 
contracting relationships [that] … serves as a focus for a complex process in which 
the conflicting objectives of individuals … are brought into equilibrium within a 
framework of contractual relations’.1 This conception of the corporation swept 
through the corporate law academy like a ‘prairie fire’,2 causing Branson to 
bemoan in 2001 that, at least in the US, ‘[e]very book and journal article in the 
corporate law field [has] to take an economics of law perspective [in order] to 
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1 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 at 311.
2 Douglas Branson, ‘A Corporate Palaeontologist’s Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh 
Circuit’ (1989) 62 Chicago-Kent Review 745 at 745, quoted by Brian Cheffins, ‘Corporations’ 
in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (2003) at 493.
148 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 31:147succeed in the marketplace of ideas’.3 In Australia, the predominance of the 
economic analysis of law was institutionalised with the introduction of the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) in 1996. The aim of CLERP 
was to use an economic analysis of law as the primary lens through which to view 
corporate law reform.
The strength of the economic analysis was that it provided an institutional 
account of corporate law. It drew attention away from the traditional binary 
concern of balancing the power of managers and owners.4 The economic analysis 
of law located corporate law within a matrix of markets, including securities 
markets, the market for corporate control, markets for managerial services, product 
markets and labour markets.5 The economic analysis of corporate law thus brought 
into focus the significant insight that corporate law both supported and facilitated 
the operation of these markets and was, at the same time, the product of these 
markets. As a result, much (but not all) economic analysis of law argued that 
corporate law should be responsive to the needs of market and that there is a very 
limited role for governments seeking to shape corporate law to achieve public 
policy objectives.6 
This individualist and market-oriented account of corporate law has been 
criticised from many different perspectives. Cheffins suggests that concerns about 
the polemical and uncaring nature of contractarian analysis have meant that the 
approach is ‘unloved’.7 Similarly, West argues that ‘economic man’ has a ‘thin’ 
subjective life which moves us away from sympathetic engagement with him.8
The challenge for those seeking to provide a democratic or political analysis of 
corporate law is, therefore, to develop either alternative9 or complementary10
paradigms to the contractarian analysis. This challenge is a difficult one because it 
requires a political account of corporate law which integrates the insight that 
corporate law is, and should to some degree be, responsive to the markets which 
frame it. Corporate law has, in this sense, both public and private dimensions. The 
3 Douglas Branson, ‘Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (1989) 62 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 605 at 619.
4 See, for example, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (rev ed, 1968).
5 See, for example, Michael Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate 
Law (2001).
6 See, for example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law (1991).
7 Cheffins, above n2 at 493. 
8 Robin West, ‘The Other Utilitarians’ in Brian Bix, Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory
(1998) at 211.
9 See, for example, John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law (1993); David Millon, ‘Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law’ (1993) Washington and Lee Law Review 1373 at 1379 (this article forms part 
of a symposium on communitarian approaches to corporate law) and Harry Glasbeek, Wealth 
by Stealth: Corporate Crime, Corporate Law and the Perversion of Democracy (2002).
10 For example, team production analysis. See Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247. 
2009]   CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 149challenge is to provide an account of corporate law that creates a space for 
corporations to internalise broader concerns of public policy. 
A recent book and winner of the 2008 Hart Socio-Legal Book Prize, The 
Constitutional Corporation by Stephen Bottomley,11 provides just such a 
complementary account of corporate law. The Constitutional Corporation is a 
pragmatic account of corporate law which opens up corporate law to political 
concerns, while acknowledging that corporate law is also private in its orientation. 
This book acknowledges the private nature of corporations and the role of 
economic analysis of law in informing corporate law. It also develops a 
complementary account of corporate law based on a constitutional or political 
analysis. The great strength of this book is that it provides an account of corporate 
law that opens up a space in which it is possible for stakeholders and governments 
to make corporations responsive to political, as well as economic, concerns. This 
‘constitutional’ account of corporate law is, therefore, relevant to anyone who is 
interested in understanding the ways in which corporations can, and should, be 
made responsive to political concerns.
This book shifts corporate law theory away from economic analysis and the 
nexus of contracts by reconceptualising the corporation as a body politic and 
applying a constitutionalist framework to corporate decisions. Within this 
framework, corporate systems must ensure that decision-makers are held 
accountable for their decisions and that those decisions are subject to deliberation 
and are contestable by members. The constitutionalist framework does not 
dislodge shareholder primacy. Instead, it incites shareholders to be actively 
involved in corporations as members rather than investors and to voice non-
financial concerns. In this review, we examine the potential of this framework to 
provide a roadmap for corporations to develop systems of corporate social 
responsibility and stakeholder responsiveness, focusing, in particular, on the 
impending challenge of climate change.
2. What Is Corporate Constitutionalism? 
Corporate constitutionalism presupposes that there are values and ideas in our 
public political life that provide useful insights when considering the legal 
regulation of corporate governance and decision-making. However, the 
‘corporate’ adjective indicates that within the corporate context these values and 
ideas will have different formulations, applications and consequences than in 
political contexts.12 The application of constitutionalism to corporations is 
germane because corporations are both social actors and polities in themselves. 
Corporate constitutionalism provides a normative framework through which 
we can assess the legitimacy of corporate decision-making.13 It relies on three 
principles:
11 Stephen Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation — Rethinking Corporate Governance
(2007).
12 Id at 12.
13 Ibid.
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characterised by a separation of decision-making powers.
2. Deliberation — corporate decisions should be subject to deliberation. 
3. Contestability — corporate decisions which do not track the interests of 
members should be readily contestable.14
This is not a clumsy imposition of constitutionalism upon corporate governance, 
and this book recognises that one cannot treat corporations as analogues of 
parliamentary systems.15 Rather, the framework has many strands. It has ‘elements 
of liberal constitutionalism (a regard for individual rights and interests), 
communitarianism (the idea that, in addition to individual members, the group has 
significance) and republicanism (stressing, in particular, the idea of governance 
according to the common good)’.16
The consequence of this framework is that the constitution replaces contract as 
the foundation of corporate governance. The company is not just a nexus of 
bilateral or multilateral agreements but is also a framework within which decisions 
are made. Although Bottomley’s framework follows the contours of the standard 
legal model of the corporation adopted in many Western legal systems (consisting 
of the board of directors and the company’s shareholders), the function of 
corporate law within this framework is to create deliberative spaces. Though the 
focus of corporate law has been upon decisions of the board and formal 
deliberation in the general meeting of shareholders, this book is a call to 
shareholders to be actively involved in deliberation and contestation beyond the 
formal general meeting. Bottomley regards corporate law as having a role in 
promoting shareholder action, as an antidote to passivity and exit. Thus, he urges 
a shift in perception from shareholders as investors to shareholders as members.17 
Moreover, the framework is evaluative rather than explanatory and prefers 
description to prescription. The author states that ‘this is an evaluative exercise: 
these principles provide benchmarks against which corporate practice and its legal 
regulation can be assessed’.18
The book discusses the contractarian model of the corporation and notes its 
domination of corporate law theory. Bottomley concludes that the contractual 
model has several limitations — it reduces complex relationships to bilateral 
agreements, it embraces economic analysis to the exclusion of other perspectives, 
its orientation is teleological rather than deontological and it invites a body of rules 
that facilitates private, voluntary, individual agreements rather than state 
regulation.19
Economic theorists denounce State interference, other than the minimum 
regulation required to establish default terms for the nexus of bilateral contracts 
14 Ibid.
15 Id at 38.
16 Id at 55.
17 Id at 14.
18 Id at 69.
19 Id at 30–3.
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burden of justifying interference. The intrusion of public law concepts is regarded 
with suspicion. In Bottomley’s view, this is a fallacy, since ‘state involvement in 
the corporate life has not withered away’.20 The constitutionalist framework 
rejects the notion that economics is the only basis for recognition of the company, 
since corporate law is partly public and partly private.21
Notably, The Constitutional Corporation does not challenge the pivotal role of 
shareholder primacy in corporate law. While many corporate law commentators 
have urged a shift away from shareholder primacy to a model which recognises the 
interests of other stakeholders, in Bottomley’s opinion a recognition of 
stakeholders in corporate law would depart too dramatically from the prevailing 
mindset of corporate managers and officers where the shareholder primacy norm 
exercises ‘a powerful grip’.22
In fleshing out the operation of the three principles of corporate 
constitutionalism referred to above, the author asserts that a system of corporate 
accountability must provide a framework that protects against the improper 
exercise of power and makes corporate decision-making power subject to a 
‘plurality of checks and balances’.23 This can be achieved through a division and 
separation of powers. The separation of powers concept is used in a broader and 
looser sense than the institutional separation of powers to which lawyers are 
accostomed. Since the concept is being applied in the private sector, one would 
expect that the taxonomies of power require different separations than the standard 
legal doctrine.24 On the Bottomley model, separation of powers is a diffused 
institutionalised system of scrutiny where each site has sufficient independence 
and autonomy to do its job but also acts as an outside monitor.25 Examples of sites 
which exercise some independent role in decision-making processes within the 
20 Id at 33.
21 Id at 29–3, 57–9.
22 Id at 8. Some commentators argue that the shareholder primacy model is an artefact of a very 
specific temporal and cultural context. It has been described by Singh et al as an ‘Anglo-Saxon 
phenomenon’. They conclude that other countries have prospered considerably without the 
shareholder primacy norm. See Ajit Singh, Alaka Singh and Bruce Weisse, Corporate 
Governance, Competition, the New International Financial Architecture, and Large 
Corporations in Emerging Markets: ESRC Centre for Business Research Working Paper 
No 250 (2002). Similarly, Deakin contends that ‘[t]he current focus on shareholder value is … 
the consequence not of the basic company law model, but of … institutional changes which have 
occurred in capital markets and securities law with increasing rapidity, … namely the rise of the 
hostile takeover bid, and the increasing use of share options and shareholder value metrics’. See 
Simon Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 11 at 14. These conclusions challenge Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s convergence theory of shareholder primacy, which asserts that corporate law based 
on shareholder primacy has achieved a high degree of uniformity around the globe due to its 
superior efficiency. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for 
Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 at 450.
23 Bottomley, above n11 at 70.
24 John Braithwaite, ‘On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a 
Republican Separation of Powers’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law Journal 305 at 307.
25 Bottomley, above n11 at 92–3.
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auditors. Bottomley suggests that other sites may develop a degree of 
independence in the decision-making process — for example, whistleblowers, 
who are protected when disclosing relevant information.26 Although it must be 
conceded that power is often fragmented and dispersed in ways that are not 
captured by the traditional ‘three branches of power’ model of separation of 
powers,27 nevertheless, these reviewers were not entirely convinced by the 
‘plurality of checks and balances’ argument. The processes of corporate 
governance that Bottomley describes are predominantly concerned with risk 
management and, in this sense, the system of accountability described by 
Bottomley conflates the rather grand and institutionally constitutive concept of 
separation of powers with its poor cousin, risk management.
The principle of deliberation requires us to determine the legitimacy of 
corporate decisions by assessing the extent to which the processes are subject to 
deliberative input, meaning that, as far as possible, there should be processes that 
are open, genuine and represent a collective judgment about the issue at hand.28
Individual interests are subject to competing perspectives that are debated and 
transformed into a collective judgment about the corporate interest.29 Bottomley 
again finds instances where this is already mandated in corporate law, for example, 
in the directors’ duty of care and diligence, which requires collective decisions.
The author borrows from Habermas’ description of deliberative politics30 to 
portray corporate decision-making as a series of concentric ‘spheres of influence’, 
with the general meeting of shareholders at the centre. Deliberation may occur at 
formal and informal sites, such as shareholders bulletin boards and corporate 
interest groups which can monitor corporate issues to facilitate discussion and 
debate on the periphery though proxy voting.31
Finally, Pettit’s concept of contestability — the permanent possibility that a 
decision that does not track the interests of the members can be effectively 
contested32 — is embraced to promote voice, rather than building corporate law 
around the exit option.33 In this respect Bottomley compares the derivative 
action,34 which promotes loyalty and corporate-regarding behaviour with the 
oppression remedy, which is used to secure exit.35 However, he argues that 
contestability options are not confined to the courtroom, and a system of corporate 
26 Id at 107.
27 See Elizabeth Magill, ‘Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law’ (2001) 150 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 603 at 651.
28 Bottomley, above n11 at 112.
29 Id at 113.
30 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (William Rehg trans, 1996 ed).
31 Bottomley, above n11 at 137–9.
32 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997). 
33 Bottomley, above n11 at 144. 
34 Id at 154.
35 Id at 157.
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as questioning directors and requisitioning a general meeting.36 
The three principles are interrelated. Therefore, they should be read together 
and shortfalls in the operation of one might potentially be addressed by another.37
In particular, effective deliberation has the potential to reduce needless 
contestation.
3. What Is Distinctive About Corporate Constitutionalism? 
This book offers a richer conception of the corporation than the nexus of contracts. 
By characterising the corporation as a body politic, Bottomley offers a multi-
dimensional model of the corporation as an institution and captures aspects of the 
corporation’s role as social actor, as well as its internal organisational life.38
Moreover, this lens allows us to evaluate corporate governance by political, as well 
as economic, criteria. The model is timely, coinciding with the United Nations’ 
recent shift to monitoring transnational corporations for abuses of human rights, in 
addition to nation states.39 
The framework of corporate constitutionalism is derived from republican 
political theory and, at times, the author makes claims that appear to give the 
framework substantive content. For example, he states that a system of corporate 
law should be ‘concerned to enhance public values such as the avoidance of 
oppressive or unfair behaviour, the use of objective, rather than purely subjective, 
standards in the evaluation of corporate behaviour and the importance of 
accountability in the exercise of power within and by corporations’.40 However, 
Bottomley’s account of the operation of corporate constitutionalism is limited to 
procedures and structures and not substantive standards. This aspect of his 
argument is important. He frequently emphasises that the framework is concerned 
with how decisions are made and that accountability, deliberation and 
contestability are concerned with the processes by which decisions are made, 
36 Id at 151.
37 Id at 170.
38 Adopting Selznick’s analysis, see Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory 
and the Promise of Community (1992) at 242.
39 See United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights (2003) UNHCR <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/
(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En> accessed 18 September 2008. In 2005, Kofi Annan 
appointed John Ruggie to the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
business and human rights. Ruggie’s report was presented to the United Nations General 
Assembly Human Rights Council on 9 February 2007. See United Nations General Assembly 
Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 
2006 entitled ‘Human Rights Council’ — Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises Business — Human Rights <http://
www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/SRSG-report-Human-Rights-Council-19-Feb-
2007.pdf> accessed 18 September 2008. 
40 Bottomley, above n11 at 57.
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outcomes should occur, but rather that corporate structure and processes should be 
assessed according to whether they embody and uphold the aforementioned 
principles.42 
The Constitutional Corporation is a pragmatic account of corporate law. It does 
not engage in the debate about whether corporations are essentially public or 
private. It does not, in any universal way, argue that corporations should be 
regulated by private agreements or be subject to regulation that is based upon a 
conception of the public interest. It does provide an account of corporate law in 
which shareholders have a special role in the system of governance. It also 
provides an account of why shareholders are not entitled to fashion the corporation 
to their own expectations in ways that are inconsistent with public policy. In this 
sense, it emphasises that one definition of the public interest in corporate law is the 
role of law and regulation in enhancing the quality and integrity of decision-
making processes within corporations.
4. Why a Republic of Shareholders Only? 
Pettit argued that a system of government that meets constitutionalist 
considerations was necessary for the promotion of freedom as non-domination.43
As stated above, Bottomley’s model embraces republicanism, but one aspect of 
republicanism has been omitted — the common good. Pettit expressed this idea as 
follows:
If the polity is deliberative, then there will be a basis for citizens to contest any 
public decision, be it legislative, administrative or judicial. And if the polity is 
inclusive then there will be a voice available to people in every part of the 
community for expressing their contestations.44 
Bottomley has omitted the inclusiveness criterion to make way for shareholder 
primacy, thereby excluding stakeholders such as employees, tort creditors and 
communities from his corporate republic. This raises the question of the role of 
corporate social responsibility within the constitutionalist framework. There are 
many definitions of corporate social responsibility. One set of definitions 
emphasises the approach by which a business enterprise ‘takes into account the 
impacts of its activities on interest groups (often referred to as stakeholders) 
including, but extending beyond, shareholders and balances longer-term societal 
interests against short-term financial gains’.45
Christine Parker has previously applied the model of deliberative democracy 
to corporations as an element of her framework for corporate self-regulation of 
41 Id at 15.
42 Id at 16.
43 Pettit, above n32 at 51–109.
44 Id at 195.
45 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (‘CAMAC’), The Social Responsibility of 
Corporations: Report (2006) at 13.
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corporation’s external responsibility to regulatory compliance, thereby avoiding 
the normative question of how far corporations must go to service the needs of 
stakeholders. Bottomley has also avoided this normative question by equating the 
deliberative spaces of the corporation with its legal model, confined to the board 
and various shareholder sites such as the general meeting. The decision to focus 
upon the existing model of the corporation with its emphasis on the interests of 
shareholders was pragmatic, since the challenge set by Bottomley was to work 
with the shareholder primacy model and look at corporations and shareholders in 
a way that opens up new possibilities for shareholder involvement, without 
necessarily shutting out other sets of interests and concerns.47 
Stakeholders do not have access to these deliberative spaces, but Bottomley 
considers that deliberation ‘does not necessarily require full and direct 
participation by all persons who are affected by the decision’.48 The needs of the 
stakeholder constituents and the requirements of corporate social responsibility 
may, nevertheless, be voiced by shareholders, since the model permits attention to 
shareholders’ non-financial concerns, such as the social and environmental 
impacts of the company’s activities.49 Notably, Bottomley urges that concerns 
about corporate social responsibility ‘must be built on the revitalisation of the 
shareholder role’.50
This raises three questions. The first two questions are empirical and focus 
upon the efficacy of corporations’ internal processes of deliberation to deliver 
socially responsible outcomes. First, are shareholders willing and able to fulfil the 
demands of corporate constitutionalism? Second, what is the role of initiatives, 
such as s 172 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK), which allow for deliberation about 
stakeholder interests in the board of directors? The third question locates the 
corporation in a broader context and examines the permeation of demands for 
corporate social responsibility into the corporation’s deliberative spaces. This 
formulation of the issue starts with the proposition that corporations are subject to 
demands from stakeholders and regulators, who are explicitly, or implicitly, calling 
for more effective systems of corporate social responsibility. In this context, we 
need to consider whether the model of governance proposed in this book will be 
effective in accommodating these demands; that is, in assisting the corporation to 
modify its internal operations in response to these external demands. 
5. Shareholders as the Conduit of Corporate Social Responsibility
Bottomley’s argument that shareholders may act as the conduit of corporate social 
responsibility is clever, but one might question whether shareholders are up to the 
modest collective demands made upon them by corporate constitutionalism. There 
46 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002).
47 Bottomley, above n11 at 8.
48 Id at 72. 
49 Id at 175.
50 Id at 178. 
156 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 31:147is evidence that points in both directions. Bottomley points to the rise of socially 
responsible investment as indicating the willingness and capacity of shareholders 
to assume a wider role.51 Further, a recent empirical study indicates that ‘human 
resource management’ is commonly raised by shareholders who are in regular 
contact with company personnel, and in unlisted companies it is discussed more 
often than dividend policy or share prices.52 Some institutional investors have 
independently established their own research organisations to investigate 
environmental, social and corporate governance, including the long term 
performance of companies and stakeholder relations.53
Conversely, commentators point to a share market which is dominated by 
institutional investors with a ‘laser-beam focus on quarter-to-quarter earnings’54
and a resolute indifference to any role other than that of investor. Bainbridge 
concluded in 2005 that rational apathy is prevalent among institutional 
shareholders and that voting, which Bottomley regards as integral to the 
shareholder voice, ‘is properly understood not as an integral aspect of the corporate 
decision-making structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort to 
be used sparingly, at best.’55 Anecdotally, the ugly face of shareholder primacy 
was revealed by shareholder reaction to corporate donations to the relief fund for 
victims of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. According to news reports: 
[The Australian Shareholders Association] expressed disapproval of companies 
pledging money to the tsunami relief effort … saying they have no approval for 
their philanthropy. Association spokesman Stephen Matthews says firms should 
51 Id at 176. A recent study of French institutional investors indicates that 61 per cent had ventured 
into socially responsible investment in 2007, compared with 48 per cent in 2006. See Novethic, 
Amadeis and BNP Paribas, Investissement Socialement Responsable (2007) Novethic <http://
www.novethic.fr/novethic/upload/etudes/Etude_ISR_2007.pdf> accessed 18 September 2008. 
52 Meredith Jones, Shelley Marshall, Richard Mitchell and Ian Ramsay, Company Directors’ 
Views Regarding Stakeholders: Research Report (2007) at 44. Note, however, that financial 
performance was the most common issue raised when the information regarding listed and 
unlisted companies in the sample was aggregated. 
53 For example, Regnan has been formed in Australia by a consortium of superannuation funds 
such as Hermes Investment Management Limited (owned by, and the principal fund manager 
for, the British Telecom Pension Scheme) and the NSW Local Government Superannuation 
Scheme. Its homepage states: ‘Regnan represents institutional investors who recognise that 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) factors affect long term shareholder 
returns. Regnan promotes strengthened ESG performance within the S&P/ASX200 companies 
in which these institutions invest’. See Regnan <http://www.regnan.com.au/index.php> 
accessed 18 September 2008. 
54 Leo Strine, ‘Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s 
Solution For Improving Corporate America’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1759 at 1764.
55 Stephen Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors: UCLA School of Law 
Law-Econ Research Paper 05-20 (2005) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=796227> accessed 18 September 2008. Although retail investors may 
express stakeholder concerns, there is evidence that their participation is dwindling in some key 
existing markets, and they are excluded entirely from some important new trading markets and 
asset classes. See Brian Cartwright, The Future of Securities Regulation (2007) US Securities 
and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm> 
accessed 18 September 2008. 
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This incident led to a call by Beerworth that directors have a defence to a complaint 
that they had acted improperly in circumstances where the directors considered the 
interests of stakeholders in their decision-making.57
Bottomley argues that shareholders can, and should, be encouraged to take 
responsibility ‘in a moral sense’ for the actions of the corporations whose shares 
they own.58 However, one cannot be entirely confident that shareholders will 
champion the interests of the broader stakeholder community. While the 
framework posited by Bottomley excludes direct participation by stakeholders in 
corporate decision-making, can their interests nevertheless be promoted in the 
board?
6. The Board as a Deliberative Space 
The capacity of the board to integrate the interests of stakeholders into corporate 
decision-making processes is an issue of general concern in corporate law. This 
debate sometimes takes the form of questioning whether directors are permitted to 
take into account the interests of stakeholders who are not shareholders.59
Sometimes, this debate is framed with reference to the question of whether 
directors should be required to take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders.60 Bottomley addresses this concern in a number of ways. He states 
that, as far as possible, the process of corporate decision-making should be open 
and genuine and convey a plurality of roles and discursive perspectives.61 He 
considers that corporate law already constitutes the board as a deliberative space. 
Accordingly, corporate constitutionalism contemplates some regulation of 
deliberation by the board, albeit by the use of structures and procedures such as the 
independent Chair. 
Against this background, one of the aims of this book is to identify a coherent 
rationale as to why boards should integrate the interests of stakeholders into 
corporate decision-making processes. Bottomley argues that corporate social 
56 ABC Radio, ‘Shareholders Association Opposes Corporate Aid Donations’, AM, 7 January 
2005 <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1278328.htm> accessed 18 September 2008.
57 Bill Beerworth, ‘A Modest Proposal: Recognise The Existence of Stakeholders’ Company 
Director 20 (2004/2005) 13 at 13.
58 Bottomley, above n11 at 176. 
59 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) imposes a duty upon directors to promote the 
success of the company. A procedural component of the duty obliges UK directors to have 
regard, inter alia, to the interests of the company’s employees, the company’s business 
relationships with customers, the long term consequences of decisions and the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment. The efficacy of such initiatives 
has been debated at length in Australia and the UK. See CAMAC, above n44; Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate Responsibility: Managing 
Risk and Creating Value (2006). For an overview and history of the UK provisions, see Charles 
Wynn-Evans, ‘The Companies Act 2006 and the Interests of Employees’ (2007) 36 Industrial 
Law Journal 188. 
60 Blair and Stout, above n10.
61 Bottomley, above n11 at 118–19. 
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understanding of the corporation’s interests that embodies the interests of 
stakeholders. In his view, however, board deliberations must take the interests of 
shareholders seriously before there can be any development of a broader 
approach.62 In light of the current arguments about the potential role of corporate 
social responsibility, one issue raised by this book is whether this approach 
enhances the potential for directors to weave the interests of stakeholders into their 
deliberations.63 It also raises the question of whether this approach will help to 
make board decision-making responsive to demands for the introduction of 
socially responsible practices into corporate decision-making practices. Arguably, 
the approach places too much weight upon the agency of shareholders and 
weakens the utility of the board as an independent site of deliberation. 
7. The Constitutional Corporation, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Climate Change
One issue which will test the capacity of shareholders and directors to integrate 
stakeholder interests into corporate decision-making processes is the challenge of 
responding to climate change. The particular issue for corporations, is the role of 
corporate social responsibility initiatives in facilitating the development of the 
capacity of corporations to modify their corporate practices in response to the 
challenges posed by climate change. Bottomley deals with this problem by 
drawing attention to the role of shareholders in corporate governance and to the 
nature of the deliberative space in which directors work and function. These two 
sets of concerns are of particular importance when we come to consider the 
relevance of organisations adopting programs of, and accommodating calls for, 
higher levels of corporate social responsibility. Arguably, the focus of this book — 
the decision-making processes within corporations — casts light on the capacity 
of corporations to develop effective systems of corporate social responsibility. 
An effective system of corporate social responsibility is dependent on the 
capacity of an organisation to recognise the external interests of stakeholders and 
translate those interests into ones that its own internal decision-making processes 
can recognise and use to further the corporation’s interests.64 An organisation’s 
internal decision-making processes must have the capacity to assess the relative 
importance of all these interests and concerns in the context of its particular 
business. The goal of corporate social responsibility, in this sense, is for an 
organisation to develop the capacity to orient its business in a multi-dimensional 
environment, where each dimension may impose competing demands.65 
62 Id at 178.
63 Blair and Stout, above n10. 
64 See, for example, Michael Power, ‘Risk Management and the Responsible Organisation’ in 
Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, Risk and Morality (2003) at 145–64.
65 Angus Corbett, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Do We Have Good Cause To Be Sceptical 
About It?’ (2008) 17 Griffith Law Review 413.
2009]   CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 159The challenge of developing effective systems of corporate social 
responsibility takes on a sense of urgency when particular organisations face 
challenges to their continued survival. This could occur where an organisation 
faces the risk of becoming insolvent, or where the risk of harm associated with a 
catastrophe or disaster threatens the continued existence of the organisation. More 
immediately, there is an important question about the capacity of organisations to 
accommodate the need for change where the potential for disaster or catastrophe 
is one that confronts the broader community. For example, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that we as individuals and nations will need to make profound 
changes, in all aspects of our lives, in order to accommodate the hazards associated 
with climate change.66 
There will be a broad range of responses to the problems associated with 
climate change. Generally, this will involve decisions about appropriate public 
policy at a governmental level and changes to our everyday lives as individuals. At 
the individual level, we will have to change patterns of consumption, transport and, 
more generally, communication. In between these two levels, business and other 
organisations will have simultaneously to accommodate policy changes from 
above and changes in the patterns of relationships with their stakeholders. 
Business organisations will need to develop the capacity to move to new patterns 
of relationships with customers,67 creditors,68 employees69 and shareholders. 
Relationships with shareholders and stakeholders will need to be aligned and re-
aligned to create new patterns of relationships that will support and sustain 
business organisations in the changed circumstances created by climate change.70
It is important to note that the challenge associated with climate change is new, 
in the sense that it is literally a challenge on a global level. Nonetheless, the process 
by which organisations transform their relationships with stakeholders is one that 
particular organisations and industries have actively engaged with for a very long 
time. For example, in the oil industry, particular organisations have responded to 
66 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis — Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) at 1–18 (a review of natural and human 
drivers of climate change). See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability — Contribution of Working Group II 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) at 
7–22 (a review of the impacts of increasing temperatures on natural and social systems).
67 See, for example, the role of customers in encouraging the development of energy efficient 
buildings. Green Building Council of Australia <http://www.gbcaus.org/default.asp> accessed 
18 September 2008.
68 See, for example, The Equator Principles <http://www.equator-principles.com/> accessed 
18 September 2008.
69 See, for example, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Principles and Policy on Global 
Warming: Position Paper (2007) ACTU <http://www.actu.asn.au/Images/Dynamic/
attachments/5351/Global%20Warming%20Policy%202007.pdf> accessed 18 September 2008.
70 For example, new relationships and arrangements will emerge as business organisations adapt 
to the development of emissions trading schemes or carbon taxes. For recent discussion, see 
Business Council of Australia, Modelling Success: Designing an ETS that Works (2008) BCA 
<http://www.bca.com.au/DisplayFile.aspx?FileID=469> accessed 18 September 2008. 
160 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 31:147the need to improve levels of safety over the last three decades. There are similar 
stories in the areas of aviation, health and nuclear power.71
This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the role of 
corporate law and corporate governance in establishing a framework for 
organisations seeking to develop more effective systems of corporate social 
responsibility. In particular, it focuses attention on the role of shareholders and 
draws attention to the processes of decision-making through which organisations 
can engage their shareholders. By focusing on the role of shareholders, this book 
also focuses on the need for directors and shareholders to redefine the interests of 
the company so that they embody the interests of stakeholders. In this sense, the 
focus on the interests of shareholders in corporate decision-making processes may 
be an important vehicle for assisting directors and shareholders to respond to the 
interests of other stakeholders and to the challenges of climate change.
8. A Pragmatic Corporate Law 
Bottomley’s pragmatic approach to corporate law is a valuable one at this time. 
The focus on shareholders is useful because shareholders are the one group who 
will need to re-orient their expectations and interests around more dynamic and 
sophisticated systems of corporate social responsibility. Shareholders will also 
have an important role in corporate governance as organisations re-orient 
themselves in the emerging multi-dimensional matrix of relationships discussed 
above. Shareholders will both lead, and be led by, changes within this matrix. In 
both instances, shareholders will have to re-align their interests and expectations 
as they come to understand the forces affecting the organisations of which they are 
members. In particular, they will need to reorient their relationships with other 
stakeholders, who are themselves re-negotiating their relationships within 
particular business organisations.
The great strength of The Constitutional Corporation is that it outlines the basis 
for a decision-making structure which shareholders can use to re-assess their 
interests and expectations. It is precisely the elements of accountability, 
deliberation and contestability which give the decision-making processes within 
business organisations the degree of resilience and robustness that is needed to 
support this re-assessment of shareholder interests and expectations. In this sense, 
this book may provide a useful roadmap of the way that corporate law can respond 
to demands from within and without corporations, as they seek to introduce more 
effective systems of corporate social responsibility. 
9. Conclusion
As with many good corporate law books, this book will both excite and disappoint 
readers. It is stimulating to read an account of corporate law which focuses on the 
71 See, for example, James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents (1997); Karl 
Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of 
Uncertainty (2nd ed, 2007).
2009]   CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 161role of the corporation as a body politic. This book is convincing because it 
integrates a concern with the quality of decision-making processes within the 
corporation with a more traditional economic understanding of corporations as a 
nexus of contracts. In brief, this book provides us with a principled account of why 
we should be concerned with the quality of decision-making within corporations.
At the same time, many readers will be troubled by the question of whether the 
decision-making processes outlined in this book are sufficiently full and intense to 
make a difference to the quality of decisions made within corporations. In this 
review, we have highlighted concerns about whether either shareholders or 
directors are capable of actively participating in these decision-making processes. 
Readers may be unconvinced about the potential of bulletin boards and other 
extended forms of shareholder participation to have any measurable impact on the 
level and quality of participation by shareholders in the governance of their 
companies. 
This review argues that these particular concerns, about the capacities of 
shareholders and directors to integrate public policy concerns into corporate 
decision-making processes, may not give sufficient attention to the magnitude of 
the problems faced by corporations in responding to the challenges presented by 
climate change. In particular, we argue that these challenges will concentrate 
attention on the quality of decision-making processes within corporations. This 
will become apparent when corporations are called on to modify their decision-
making processes and their practices in response to demands from stakeholders 
and governments. Often this will take the form of demands from stakeholders and 
governments for corporations to develop effective systems of corporate social 
responsibility. 
One of the consequences of attempts to accommodate the impacts of climate 
change will be the need for corporations to develop more effective systems of 
accountability. This book, which aims to engage shareholders in the process of 
corporate governance, may help to create a space in which shareholders come to 
re-assess and re-negotiate their expectations and interests in companies, in the 
context of the impact of climate change. In this sense, the pragmatic account of 
corporate law in this book may actually mesh with the practical and pragmatic 
interests of shareholders who are engaged with the challenge of creating effective 
systems of corporate social responsibility.
In conclusion, this book provides a subtle account of corporate law, which has 
the capacity to challenge some of our basic conceptions about what we should 
expect of this area of law. There are reasons for being sceptical about whether the 
main propositions in this book will make a difference. There is, however, the 
possibility that this account of corporate law may be a roadmap that corporations 
and their shareholders will use to accommodate demands for developing effective 
systems of corporate governance. It is this possibility that should inspire people to 
read this book and engage with the arguments it develops. 
